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COOPERATIVES AND CORPORATE FARMING LAWS
— by Neil E. Harl*
In 1982, Nebraska voters approved Proposition 300,
Nebraska’s anti-corporate farming law.1  The Nebraska
provision  has been criticized for its detailed, complex and
not completely consistent approach to limiting
corporations.  The constitutional measure bars
corporations or syndicates from acquiring real estate in the
state except for family farm or ranch corporations; non-
profit corporations; Indian tribal corporations; and several
other categories of corporate enterprises.2  The Nebraska
Supreme Court has now ruled on whether a nonstock
cooperative involved in hog production was exempt from
the law as a “non-profit corporation.”3
The cooperative in question was formed by five
individuals in 1994 “so that together they [could] acquire
feeder pigs, feed, and related products and services on a
collective, cooperative, and cost-of-production basis.”
The articles of incorporation limited membership in the
cooperative to “persons actively engaged in the feeding of
hogs for slaughter.”  Members purchase feeder pigs from
the cooperative as well as feed and animal health supplies.
The articles and bylaws state that “net margins” were to be
allocated to the members on a patronage basis.  The
Nebraska Nonstock Cooperative Marketing Act4 specifies
that associations organized under the act are deemed to be
nonprofit “...inasmuch as they are not organized to make
profits for themselves as such or for their members as such
but only for their members as producers.”
The district court held that the cooperative was a
“nonprofit corporation” not subject to Proposition 300.5
The district court found that the Nebraska Nonstock
Cooperative Marketing Act6 provided an “absolute and
unqualified” designation of a nonstock cooperative as a
“nonprofit corporation.”  The Nebraska Supreme Court
reversed, pointing out that while the cooperative itself
does not retain profits, “it is nonetheless operated for the
purpose of generating economic gain for the producers
who compose its membership.”7  The Nebraska Supreme
Court noted that all “savings” from its operations inure to
the exclusive benefit of its members, who have a
“permanent investment” in the cooperative, not to
agriculture in general.  Members will have a permanent
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investment in the  enterprise represented by their initial and
subsequently acquired base capital credits.  Members will
be eligible to receive annual “patronage refunds”
representing each member’s share of any amount by
which the Cooperative’s annual gross receipts exceed
expenses and required reserves.  The court noted that five
unrelated individuals could not carry on a swine farrowing
facility in corporate form and saw no reasonable basis for
treating a nonstock cooperative differently.  The court held
that the cooperative in question was subject to the
constitutional restriction on ownership of Nebraska real
estate used in farming or ranching.
It is not known how many operations have been set up
as cooperatives to circumvent state corporate farming laws
on the grounds that the cooperative is “non-profit.”  For
those who have, the Nebraska case is bad news, indeed.
In some states, such as Iowa, the legislature has
specifically exempted cooperatives from the state statutory
corporate farming law.8  A cooperative, to be exempt from
the state anti-corporate farming law, must meet several
requirements— (1) farming entities must own 60 percent
of the stock and be eligible to cast at least 60 percent of
the votes; (2) “authorized persons” must own at least 75
percent of the stock and be eligible to cast at least 75
percent of the votes; and (3) the cooperative must not,
directly or indirectly, acquire or lease agricultural land if
the total would exceed 640 acres.9  Such a move is far
more difficult in Nebraska where the corporate farming
limitations are imbedded in the state constitution.10
FOOTNOTES
1 Neb. Const. Art. XII, § 1.  The Nebraska provision has
been held constitutional.  MSM Farms, Inc. v. Spire,
927 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1991) (equal protection and due
process challenges).  See generally 6 Harl, Agricultural
Law  § 51.04[2][h] (1997).  Harl, Agricultural Law
Manual § 7.02[1][c] (1997).
2 Neb. Const. Art. XII, § 1.
3 Pig Pro Nonstock Cooperative v. Moore, 253 Neb. 72,
568 N.W. 2d 217 (1997).
4 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-1401 et seq.
5 See n. 3 supra.
6 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-1401(2).
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7 Pig Pro Nonstock Cooperative v. Moore, 253 Neb. 72,
568 N.W. 2d 217 (1997).
8 Iowa Code § 501.103(1) (1997).
9 Iowa Code § 501.103(1) (1997).
10 Neb. Const. Art. XII, § 1.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS. The debtors claimed a homestead
exemption for their residence and the 58 acres of land on
which it was located. The property was located within the
city limits and consisted of the house, a barn and other
farm buildings, and open land used for crop production and
pasturing horses. The property was not platted but was
surrounded by residential properties of normal size for city
dwellings. The debtors had sold a portion of the property
which was converted to a residential subdivision. The
property was not surrounded by residential properties when
purchased 35 years ago and the debtors had used the
property continuously, except for the sold portion, as a
farm. The court held that, under state law, the debtors’ 58
acre property retained its character as rural farm property
eligible for the rural homestead exemption of up to 120
acres. In re Becker, 212 B.R. 322 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1997).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
POST-PETITION INTEREST.  The debtors filed for
Chapter 11 in 1982 and the IRS filed a secured and an
unsecured claim for employment taxes owed by the
debtors. The proof of claim indicated that additional
interest may be assessed on the claim during the
bankruptcy case. However, the IRS did not file any claim
for post-petition interest on the secured claim. The debtors’
plan provided for full payment of the tax claim but did not
include any payment for post-petition interest on the
secured claim. The debtor received a discharge but after the
discharge, the IRS sought to collect interest for the post-
petition, pre-confirmation period. The court held that no
post-petition, pre-confirmation interest was allowed where
the IRS failed to file a claim or object to the plan. United
States v. Victor, 121 B.R. 1383 (10th Cir. 1997).
SETOFF. The debtor airline was owed a refund of
excise taxes by the IRS. The debtor owed claims made by
other federal governmental agencies, including the Federal
Aviation Administration, the Defense Finance Accounting
Service and the National Finance Center. The agencies
sought to offset the IRS refund against the amounts owed
to the agencies. The court held that the setoff was allowed
because the agencies of the federal government were
considered a governmental unit for purposes of the setoff
rules. In re HAL, Inc., 122 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 1997),
aff’g, 196 B.R. 159 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1996).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.*  The FCIC has
adopted as final regulations which include the Canning and
Processing Tomato Endorsement in the Common Crop
Insurance Policy and restrict the endorsement provisions to
1997 and earlier crop years. 62 Fed. Reg. 54339 (Oct. 20,
1997).
The FCIC has adopted as final regulations which
include the Prune Endorsement in the Common Crop
Insurance Policy and restrict the endorsement provisions to
1997 and earlier crop years. 62 Fed. Reg. 58628 (Oct. 30,
1997).
The FCIC has adopted as final regulations which
include the Canning and Processing Bean Endorsement in
the Common Crop Insurance Policy and restrict the
endorsement provisions to 1997 and earlier crop years. 62
Fed. Reg. 58621 (Oct. 30, 1997).
MILK MARKETING ORDERS.  The plaintiff milk
producer association challenged as arbitrary and capricious
the Class I pricing scheme of the federal milk marketing
orders promulgated under the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act, 7 U.S.C. § 608c(1). The current ruling was
the third time the court had ruled on the issue of whether
the USDA had sufficient evidence to make the factual
findings required by the statute to support the pricing
scheme. In the first two rulings, the court found that the
USDA had failed to make specific factual findings as
required by the statute to support the pricing system. In the
current ruling, the court again found that the USDA did not
make sufficient factual findings as required by the statute.
The court concluded that after three attempts, the USDA
had no possibility of making the required factual findings
and held that the Class I pricing scheme was arbitrary and
contrary to the statute. The statute required the pricing
scheme to be based upon “the price of feeds, the available
supply of feeds, and other economic conditions which
affect market supply and demand for milk or its products in
the marketing area to which the contemplated marketing
agreemnt, order, or amendment relates.” Instead, the court
found that the current Class I pricing scheme was based
solely upon the local market’s distance from Eau Claire,
WI. The court found that, even if the distance differential
had an effect on local markets, the USDA had failed to
demonstrate that effect.   Minnesota Milk Producers v.
Glickman, Civil No. 4-90-31 (D. Minn. 1997).
RECORDS. The defendant was a farmer who had
received federal farm disaster payments. In response to a
